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Abstract Optimal monetary policy models in the linear–quadratic framework pro-
duce high variability of interest rates, and are hence inconsistent with the data where
typically interest rate smoothing is observed. In this paper we determine optimal mon-
etary polices in a VAR model of the Polish economy with parameter uncertainty.
We prove that there exists a structure of the multiplicative uncertainty in the optimal
linear–quadratic model that explains the central bank’s behaviour. Thus proving that
parameter uncertainty can be the rationale for “timid” movements in the short-interest
rate dynamics. Finally, we show that there is trade off between parameter uncertainty
and the interest rate smoothing incentive.
Keywords Optimal monetary policy · Parameter uncertainty · The Brainard
conservatism principle · Interest rate smoothing · SVAR model
JEL Classification E47 · E52
1 Introduction
The fundamental point of the analysis presented in this paper is based on the assump-
tion that policy makers act in an optimal manner. This hypothesis is consistent with a
generally accepted principle of economics which states that any economic behaviour
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can be understood as a problem of constrained optimization (see Tinbergen 1952;
Theil 1961). It is believed that this principle should apply to central banks (CBs)
(see Friedman 1969; Svensson 1997; Galí 2009) as strictly as to the representative
firm or household. However, standard optimal inflation targeting rules obtained in
linear–quadratic models are inconsistent with data and produce a too aggressive pol-
icy. Moreover, the majority of central bank short-term interest rate paths are smooth
and only gradual changes can be observed. This gradualism has been considered as evi-
dence that monetary policy makers follow the interest-rate smoothing incentive and it
can be explained using the optimal monetary policy models by adding the interest-rate
smoothing term to the CBs objective function (Goodfriend 1987). But this heuristic
procedure has not much substantiation in central bank’s targets and raises the ques-
tion: What are the rational reasons for the gradual movements in the monetary policy
instrument?
This paper examines whether gradual movements of optimal interest rates can be
explained by incorporating a structure of parameter uncertainty for an optimal central
bank with the sole aim of price and output stability. More precisely, we investigate
the effects of different forms of uncertainty in the linear framework on the optimal
central bank policy. In models with parameter uncertainty we minimize the expected
value of central bank’s objective function which is calculated also with respect to the
random model’s parameters and as a result we obtain a so called optimal policy with
multiplicative uncertainty (or in short robust monetary policy).
TheBrainard conservatism principle1 not always turns out to be fulfilled in dynamic
models. In existing literature this principle is confirmed for a few dynamic models of
monetary economy, but still under the assumption that there is no correlation between
the risk and the parameter uncertainty. An unambiguous answer to the question of
whether the correlated uncertainty about parameters affect optimal monetary policy is
not known. We examine the Brainard principle in the presence of correlation between
random parameters and exogenous shocks.
This paper proposes a general method based on the dynamic programming prin-
ciple to derive optimal monetary policy rules with multiplicative uncertainty (see
“Appendix 1”). These rules are those that are the best amongst those that yield an
acceptable performance in a specified range of models described by parameter uncer-
tainty of the structural model. In this paper we propose a new and simple approach to
uncertainty-management with no active learning process, where estimation and con-
trol are separated.We apply dynamic programmingmethods for general linear systems
to derive exact solutions. Moreover, we assume that the model parameters follow a
serially uncorrelated process with an estimated mean and variance at the beginning
of the decision period. This framework helps us to obtain an analytical solution of
optimal monetary policy and makes the counter-factual model simulations feasible in
reasonable time. Furthermore, we do not need to impose any prior assumptions on the
parameters distribution.
In addition to the main contribution, we show empirical application for Poland. As
the true model of the economy is unknown, we estimate a VAR model of monetary
1 According to which: if the parameter uncertainty at control variable is uncorrelated with endogenous
shocks, then the model gives less aggressive policies (see Brainard 1967; Rudebusch 2001).
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transmission mechanism in Poland with parameter uncertainty. We do not impose
any restriction on random model parameters, hence this approach can to some extent
handle model uncertainty. On the basis of the estimated model the optimal paths of
macroeconomic variables are found and the analysis of impulse response functions
(IRFs) with different stochastic structures of parameters is conducted. Analysing not
only these structures of parameter uncertainty but also controlling the level of mul-
tiplicative incertitude we compare volatility of macroeconomic variables and IRFs
from optimal monetary policy models with the empirical model counterparts to find
the uncertainty structure which matches closer the optimal policy to data. We com-
pare the individual influence of two factors: structural uncertainty in macroeconomic
dynamics and smoothing term in the central bank objective function on the optimal
unrestricted policy rule. We show that the optimal paths of interest rates in the model
which has certainty and an interest rate smoothing term in the objective function can be
approximated by the optimal interest rates derived from themodelwithout a smoothing
term, but with appropriately chosen uncertainty parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we briefly review the existing
literature on uncertainty in monetary policy. Section 3 introduces the linear model of
monetary transmission mechanism with parameter uncertainty. In Sect. 4 we derive
the solution to the optimal monetary policy problem with multiplicative uncertainty.
Section 5 contains the empirical results where we compare the optimal monetary
policy rules with different structures of model uncertainty. In Sect. 6 we conclude our
findings.
2 Related Literature on Uncertainty in Monetary Policy
Researchers and central bank practitioners list several sources of uncertainty that can
disturb the monetary policy rules (see Poole 1998; Goodhart 1999; Blinder 1999;
Greenspan 2004; Onatski and Williams 2003; Woodford 2003a): exogenous shocks
which are usually connected with the risk of the model, random economy parame-
ters with unknown distribution i.e. Knightian uncertainty and finally data and model
uncertainty. In the view of many policymakers a little stodginess at the central bank
is entirely appropriate (see Blinder 1999, and the Kohn comments to Batini and Hal-
dane 1999), since among other things they have little confidence in estimates of the
size of the output gap, the equilibrium interest rate and model parameters. As noted
by Chow et al. (1975) in general there are no one-sided relationships between the
parameter uncertainty and policy rule. Hence quantitative analysis is required.
Inmanypapers the effect of parameter uncertainty on the performance of the optimal
Taylor rule is analysed. The authors conclude that in parsimoniously parametrized
structural models the parameter uncertainty does not make the optimal Taylor rule
attenuated (see Rudebusch 2001; Estrella and Mishkin 1999; Peersman and Smets
1999; Smets 2002 and reference therein). However, Estrella and Mishkin (1999) and
Svensson (1999) demonstrate a positive influence of parameter uncertainty at the
policy variable in the IS equation on central bank gradual decisions. Other works that
also confirm some moderation of optimal policy assume an unrestricted rule and a
VAR model with many lags (see Söderström 1999; Salmon and Martin 1999; Sack
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2000) or many independently distributed parameters in the restricted VARmodel (see
Söderström 2002). Sack (2000) gets round the problem of random multipliers and
replaces the state variable with its expected value in the previous period, which imply
that the central bank cannot respond to contemporaneous shocks in the economy, and
assumes that the expected objective function depends both on the squared deviations
of expected variables from targets, and on the variance of the targeted variables. This
form of uncertainty limits the aggressive movements in the interest rate. Using the
Sack approach in Salmon and Martin (1999) the authors confirm the same results
for the UK economy. Söderström (2002) considers a simple monetary policy model
developed by Svensson (1999). Under the assumption that random parameters are
independent of structural shocks and have a diagonal variance–covariance matrix he
proves that uncertainty does not necessarily dampen the policy response. Söderström
shows that parameter uncertainty at lagged inflation can even increase the optimal
response of the interest rate.
Optimal control theory for models with multiplicative uncertainty advise a policy
maker how to make optimal decisions from the point of view of minimizing average
loss and when the model approximates a correct one. Whereas robust control theory
tells us how to make good decisions in the worst case scenario i.e. decision makers
minimize worst-case loss (see Hansen and Sargent 2008; Barlevy 2011; Hudgins and
Na 2016). Robust policy rules are found assuming that the moments of parameter
uncertainty are not available and by using min–max methods where the maximization
is taken over the range of parameter values and then we minimize with respect to
control variables (cf. Kendrick 2005). In Onatski and Stock (2002), Giannoni (2002)
and Giannoni (2007) the authors using the min–max technique show that the robust
optimal policy rule is likely to involve an aggressive response of the interest rate to
inflation and the output gap shocks than is the case in the absence of uncertainty. A
systematic approach based on model error modelling to find robust Taylor-type rules
is presented in Onatski andWilliams (2003), where Bayesian and minimax techniques
are compared. The authors noticed that in theBayesian case the result strongly depends
on prior beliefs of model parameters. With uninformative priors the Bayesian optimal
policy rules were attenuated, whereas for stronger prior beliefs and in the min–max
case the Bayesian optimal and robust rules were more aggressive than in the absence
of uncertainty.
As noted in Blinder (1999) uncertainty about parameters in optimal monetary
policy models is much more difficult to handle. The usual approach to uncertainty-
management in the models of monetary transmission mechanism is the application of
Bayesian decision-making, where the optimal monetary policy model can be written
as the adaptive control problem (Prescott 1972; Zellner 1996; Wieland 2000). In this
framework active learning and design techniques are involved and subjective assump-
tion on prior parameters distributions is needed. The Bayesian approach seems to be
an adequate framework for uncertainty-management, but since the updating equations
are non-linear, the determination of an exact solution usually appears to be impossi-
ble. As a result numerical approximation is used to find solutions (Easley and Kiefer
1988; Kiefer and Nyarko 1989; Zellner 1996) which involves high computational
costs. Much research on monetary policy states that optimal central banks face a trade
off between control and estimation since they are uncertain about the model parame-
123
Robust Monetary Policy in a Model of the Polish…
ters. Moreover, policy actions may affect the relationships between controls and state
variables. Unfortunately the adaptive control approach has not widely attracted the
attention of economists or central bank practitioners.2 According to Blinder (1999)
the explanation of this inadvertence is as follows: “You don’t conduct experiments on
a real economy solely to sharpen your econometric estimates”.
3 Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism with Uncertainty
We build an empirical monetary policy model for the Polish economy using the vector
autoregressive equations with exogenous variables estimated on the quarterly data
for the period 2000–2014. Let us recall that in 1998, the Monetary Policy Council
(MPC) in Poland announced its decision to adopt an inflation targeting regime. Since
2004 MPC has fixed an inflation target at the level of 2.5% and has used short run
interest rate to bring the inflation as close as possible to its target constant level of
2.5%. A practical utility of the optimal and risk-sensitive monetary policy rules in
a vector autoregressive framework for the Polish economy were presented in Milo
et al. (2013), Bogusz et al. (2015) and Górajski and Ulrichs (2016). In the latter paper
authors shows that risk-sensitive monetary policy rules response stronger to shocks
than standard optimal rules. As our model uses only one conventional instrument—
short term interest rate, we abstract from unconditional forward guidance policy that
was applied in 2013 (see Baranowski and Gajewski 2016).
In this paper it is assumed that the economy fluctuation is described by a state
vector yt = [xt , πt , qt ]′ consisting of output gap, xt = logGDPt
̂GDPt
, deviation of inflation
from its target, πt = CPIt − ̂CPIt , and deviations of real effective exchange rate
from its long run trend qt = REERt − ̂REERt .3 The only tool used by the policy
maker to influence the economy state yt is the monetary policy instrument, it =
WIBOR1Mt − ̂WIBOR1Mt , being the deflection of onemonth interest rateWIBOR1Mt
around its trend value ̂WIBOR1Mt .4 The model is described by the following vector














it = c1 + D0yt + D1yt−1 + Eit−1 + eit
y0, i−1 are given,
(1)
2 Kendrick (1981) presents several applications of adaptive control in economics.
3 Here CPIt stands for inflation, measured using consumer price index, annual percentage changes and
CPItargett is the National Bank of Poland target inflation,GDPt is seasonally adjusted realGDP and ̂GDPt
represents potentialGDP and is obtained byHodrick–Prescott filter;REERt is real effective exchange rate in
Poland, 2010q1=100, seasonally adjusted and ̂REERt is Hodrick–Prescott trend of real effective exchange
rate.
4
̂WIBOR1Mt is estimated long-term trend of interest rate in period t (seasonally adjusted,Hodrick–Prescott
filter).
5 oilt is oil Brent price in period t per barrel in the Polish zloty at constant prices of 2010. Oil prices are




where t = 1, 2 . . . , T, eet = C0oilt + C1oilt−1 + ξ et , ξ et = [ξ xt , ξπt , ξqt ]′, eit =
F0oilt + F1oilt−1 + εit are exogenous shocks such that cov(ξ et , εit |Ft−1) = 06 and
c0, c1, A, B, C0, C1, D0, D1, E, F0, F1 ∼ F0 are matrices of parameters obtained
from OLS estimation (sample period 2000.q1–2013.q4, see “Appendix 2” for more
details).
We call the equation for it in (1) the empirical interest rate rule. It assumes that there
is immediate dependence of it on exogenous shocks ξ et passed by the term D0yt . This
partial structure of shock is consistent with models describe in Bernanke and Blinder
(1992) andSack (2000). The results of Söderström (1999) andSack (2000) are based on
the simplest method of identification which is the Choleski decomposition, whereas in
Salmon and Martin (1999) authors follow the short run zero restrictions in variance–
covariance decomposition, introduced by Sims (1986). We propose a novel shock
identification procedure based on optimal policy rule (see “Appendix 3”). The method
assumes that the structure of exogenous shocks is estimated using the restriction put
on the impulse response function of the optimal interest rate rule.



























In Sect. 4 we replace the empirical interest rate rule with robust optimal momentary
rules which take into account both: central bank objectives and uncertainty shocks (2).
3.1 Structures of Parameter Uncertainty at State and Control Variables
We consider three stochastic structures ofmodel uncertainty and the benchmarkmodel
with certainty i.e. ξAt , ξ
B
t = 0. (see Table 1). The first structure of uncertainty assumes
that parameters at control variable are random. In the second we add the uncertainty
to parameters at state variables and assume that they are uncorrelated with each other
and with the exogenous shocks. The last stochastic structure of the model allows
for correlations between random parameters and exogenous shocks. In all the above
consideredversionofmodel (1)we assume that shocks in period t have zero conditional

































6 Ft = σ(i−1, y0, (oils )ts=0, (ξes )ts=1, (εis )ts=1, (ξAs )ts=1, (ξBs )ts=1) is σ -algebra of events observed up to
the period t . The condition cov(ξet , ε
i
t |Ft−1) = 0 means that the monetary policy shock εit does not have
instantaneous impact on macroeconomic variables yt which is consistent with the observation that nominal
and real rigidities prevent economic agents from making instantaneous adjustments.
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Table 1 Optimal monetary policy models with certainty and uncertainty
Model version Uncertainty operators
Model with certainty None, un = 0
Model with uncertainty at control variable GB, un > 0
Model with uncorrelated uncertainty GA,GB, un > 0
Model with correlated uncertainty GA,GB,GAB,GAξ ,GBξ , un > 0
for all t > 0 andm, n ∈ {1, 2, 3},m = n. The last condition reflects lack of correlation
between uncertainty shocks of different equations.
Moreover, in the model with correlated uncertainty it is assumed that for allm,∈=






























where the variance–covariance matrices Σm,A, Σm,Aξ e , Σm,Bξ e , Σm,Aξ e , σm,B are
estimated at the beginning of decision period (see “Appendix 2”), and un ≥ 0 is
the uncertainty parameter. For un = 0 we get the model with certainty. The first
structure of shocks assumes uncertainty only in parameters at control variable (it ),
hence here we assume that Σm,Aξ e = 0, Σm,Bξ e = 0, Σm,AB = 0 and Σm,A = 0
for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In the model with uncorrelated uncertainty we assume that
Σm,Aξ e = 0, Σm,Bξ e = 0, Σm,AB = 0 and Σm,A is diagonal for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Having variances and covariances of shocks we define the uncertainty oper-
ators GA: M (4 × 4) → M(4 × 4), GB: M (4 × 4) → R, GAB: M (4 × 4) →
R
4, GAξ : M (4 × 4) → R4, GBξ : M (4 × 4) → R by the following formulae7:
GA (K) = un · Σ3m=1kmmΣm,A, GAξ (K) = un · Σ3n=1Σ3m=1knmΣn,Aξ e em,
GB (K) = un · Σ3m=1kmmσ 2m,B, GBξ (K) = un · Σ3n=1Σ3m=1knmΣn,Bξ e em,
GAB(K) = un · Σ3m=1kmmΣm,AB (6)
for all K = [knm]4x4, where vectors e1, e2, e3 forms the canonical orthonormal basis
in R3 and where parameter un ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} measures the degree of multiplicative
uncertainty in the model.
Table 1 shows the relationship between the stochastic structure of the model and
uncertainty operators. Observe that operator GA reflects the uncertainty of parameters
A at state variable, GB contains the randomness of parameters B at control variable,
whereas GAB measures both variability of all random parameters and correlation
7 M (m × n) stand for the linear space of m × n matrices.
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between them. Operators GAξ ,GBξ are created from covariances between parameter
uncertainty shocks and exogenous shocks. Finally, notice that if there is certainty of
model parameters (un = 0), then all uncertainty operators are equal to zero.
4 Optimal Model of Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty
For the optimal central banks we assume the following inter-temporal quadratic loss













γ t (it − it−1)2 (7)
where γ is a discount factor, the weight at deviation of inflation from its target is
normalized to one, λ determines the relative weight of the deviations of GDP, ν is
an interest rate smoothing parameter of L . We consider two types of optimal central
bank policies. The first only wants to stabilize both prices and the output gap, thus the
bank follows flexible inflation targeting i.e. policy makers assume that λ > 0, ν = 0
in (7). The second optimal CB follows the flexible objective function with interest
rate smoothing incentive, hence policy makers choose the loss function (7) with λ >
0, ν > 0. Notice that we consider a finite decision horizon T . Therefore, the following














it−1 + dt + P11εet
y0 is given and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . (9)
where dt = c0 + C0oilt + C1oilt−1, IT = {(it )T−1t=0 : it = it (y0, y1, . . . , yt ), t =
0, 1, . . . , T −1} is the set of admissible polices and Risk(L) = Eεe (L|ξA, ξB) is a risk
function associate with L .8 Therefore, in (8) the excepted value is taken with respect to
two sources of randomness: exogenous shocks εe = [εx , επ , εq ] and parameter uncer-
tainty shocks ξA, ξB and can be rewritten as:E(ξA,ξB)(Risk(L)|F0) = E(L|F0)9 (see
DeGroot 2005). Moreover, if un > 0, then the solution i∗t to (8)–(9) takes into account
the perturbations ξAt , ξ
B
t to the estimated model parameters and in this way i
∗
t consti-
tute robust monetary policy with respect to model uncertainty.
8 For vector (X, Y ) of random variables we use the notation E(X,Y )F(X, Y ) to express the expected value
of F(X, Y ) with respect the joint probability distribution. Moreover, by the law of total probability we get
E(X,Y )F(X, Y ) = EX (EY (F(X, Y )|X)).
9 Our approach to uncertainty management assumes that parameter probability distributions are unknown.
But a decision-maker form some subjective probability distribution. Hence to some extent the vectors of
shocks (ξA, ξA) can be interpreted as form of theKnightian uncertainty (seeCagliarini andHeath 2000).We
assume that this subjective probability coincide with the distribution of the parameter estimates, therefore
the policy-maker uses these estimates to construct robust policy which minimizes the expected loss with
respect to both risk of the model and multiplicative uncertainty.
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In “Appendix1” the solution to the general linear–quadratic optimal control problem
with multiplicative uncertainty is presented. Here we apply these results in order to
derive the formula for optimal and robust monetary policy rules. As the objective
function of CBwith interest rate smoothing incentive contains lagged control variables
we need to use the following state space representation of (9) to derive the optimal
monetary policy. Let Xt = [yt , it−1]′ be a new state variable, then Xt satisfies the
equation of the form:








ut + ξt+1 (10)






























. The expected loss function













〈FtXt , ut 〉 + 1
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⎦ , Rt = ν, F = [0, 0, 0,−ν]. Therefore, the optimal monetary policy
with uncertainty is the solution to the problem of minimizing (11) subject to (10).
Applying Theorem 1 from “Appendix 1” to the optimal monetary policy problem
(11)–(10) we obtain the formulae for flexible inflation targeting policy with interest




] + gt , (12)
and for the flexible inflation targeting monetary rule (ν = 0):


















Here (Kt )Tt=0 is the solution to the Riccati recursion [see “Appendix 1” Eq. (23)],
(pt )Tt=0 satisfies (24). The uncertainty operators in (14)–(16) and in (23)–(24) indicate
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Table 2 Experiments on models of optimal monetary policy
Scenario
1 Optimal inflation targeting policy in the model with certainty (un = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0)
2 Optimal inflation targeting with interest rate smoothing incentive in the model with certainty
(un = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0.55)
3 Robust inflation targeting policy in the model with correlated uncertainty
(un > 0, corr = 1, λ = 0.2, ν = 0)
4 Robust inflation targeting policy in the model with uncorrelated uncertainty
(un > 0, corr = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0)
5 Robust inflation targeting policy in model with uncertainty at control variable
(un > 0, corr = 0, ξA = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0)
dependence of optimalmonetary rule on the stochastic structure of parameter shocks.10
Thus the policy does not follow the equivalence principle (see Simon 1956; Theil 1957)
and takes into account not only the means but also the variances and covariances of
shocks. The last property makes the optimal interest rate to be robust on uncertainty of
model parameters. Notice that the optimal central bank with interest rate smoothing
incentive implements the policy rule given by (12), which assumes some amount of
persistence as it depends on lagged interest rate. Whereas the unrestricted optimal
flexible inflation targeting rule (13) does not depend on the lagged it−1, and therefore
the smoothing effect of the optimal interest rate can be explained only by a structure
of uncertainty in the model (see Sect. 5).
5 Empirical Results
In this sectionwe consider the simulation on the optimal and robustmonetary transmis-
sionmodels (9) with two parametrizations of the objective function and four structures
of exogenous shocks (see Table 2). In Scenarios 1, 3, 4, 5 we assume flexible inflation
targeting, whereas only in Scenario 2 we add to the central bank objectives an interest
rate smoothing incentive term. Scenarios 1 and 2 constitute two benchmark monetary
policy models with certainty of model parameters. In the second group of simulations
(Scenarios 3, 4 and 5) there is a positive uncertainty about model parameters and at
the same time there is no smoothing interest rate term at CB objective function.
We calibrate the relative weight of output gap λ = 0.2 in objective function based
on the estimated DSGE model of the Polish economy (Baranowski et al. 2013) and
the quadratic approximation of the wealth function (cf. Galí 2009; Polito andWickens
2012). Then the smoothing parameter ν = 0.55 is calibrated in such a way that
makes the distance between the optimal monetary policy rule with smoothing term
10 Notice that in (10) the uncertainty shocks affect only first coordinate ofXt thus the uncertainty operators
are given by (6) i.e. G
A
= GA, GB = GB, GAB = GAB, GAξ = GAξe , GBξ = GBξe .
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at objective function (Scenario 2) and robust monetary policy rule with un = 3 and
uncorrelated uncertainty (Scenario 4) to be minimal.
We assume that the decision horizon equal to T = 24 quarters, which corresponds
to the length of the term in office of the Monetary Policy Council in Poland or can
be approximately equal to the time of Poland’s entrance to Eurozone. After Poland’s
accession to the European monetary union the Polish economy will undergo structural
changes and as consequence before this moment we can expect an increase in model
uncertainty.
There are several methods to implement optimal policy experiments, which differ
in the amount of information used (see Section 4.2 in Polito and Wickens 2012).
In this paper in all the experiments we assume that in each period, the policy is re-
optimised with decision horizon reduced by one compared to the previous period,
i.e. at the beginning we find the policy instrument with finite decision horizon T ,
in the subsequent quarter we determine the policy with horizon T − 1, and after
T − 1 periods we make the decision about interest rate taking into account that it will
affect the economy only in one quarter ahead. This assumption means that after T
periods from the initial moment, the economy will undergo structural change (such
as Eurozone accession) which leads to among others different policy instruments.
We make the unrealistic assumption that the first two moments (mean, variances and
covariances) of the VAR parameters and the values of exogenous variable (oilt ) are
known for the whole decision period. Then we reconstruct the VAR paths for both the
optimal (un = 0) and robust (un > 0) policy rules by computing the optimal values of
the policy instruments and the one-period-ahead forecasts of the state variables using
actual and past values of the state vector and current period disturbances ξ et .
5.1 Optimal and Robust Trajectories Without Interest Rate Smoothing
In this section we solve several versions of the optimal CB problem (8)–(9) under
the assumption that policy makers do not follow the interest rate smoothing incentive.
Using the results presented in Sect. 4 the optimal and robust policy rule is given by (13).
Figure 1 present the optimal and robust paths of macroeconomic variables for Sce-
narios 1, 4 (see Table 2) with different levels of uncertainty parameter un = 0, 1, 3.11
In Table 3 volatility measures of robust and optimal solutions (Scenarios 1, 3, 4, 5)
are compared with each other and with their actual counterparts.
The optimal policy in certainty (Scenario 1) is very oscillating and thus it does not
fit recent historical patterns of central bank policies. There are periods where optimal
nominal interest rates are strictly below the zero level eg −3% in 2012q2 and −1%
in 2013q2.12 Whereas in models with a high level of uncertainty un = 3 the interest
11 Figures 1 and 2 present the trajectories of the following variables: interest rate (top left panel), inflation
(top right panel), output gap (bottom left panel), exchange rate (bottom right panel), where subscripts ∗
means the optimal path and superscript hat indicates the empirical trend path.
12 The floor to nominal interest rates is given by the costs of holding currency (see Yates 2004), hence
negative close to zero values of interest rates are consistent with a theory. By taking a positive weight, ν,
on the interest rate smoothing term in Eq. (7) we can eliminate the negative nominal interest rates eg. see
Fig. 2 for ν = 0.55.
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Fig. 1 The actual, optimal and robust trajectories in Scenarios 1 and 4







Scenario un |π∗| (%) |i∗| (%) |x∗| (%) |q∗| (%)
1 (λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 0 0.51 3.06 0.89 9.28
3 (corr = 1, λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 1 0.50 2.08 0.87 8.76
2 0.51 1.76 0.88 8.63
3 0.53 1.59 0.89 8.58
4 (corr = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 1 0.52 2.25 0.89 8.71
2 0.64 1.58 0.93 8.09
3 0.89 1.23 0.99 7.56
5 (ξA = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 1 0.52 2.29 0.89 8.77
2 0.59 1.66 0.92 8.27
3 0.72 1.35 0.96 7.95
Actual – 1.39 0.93 1.19 5.90
rates are over zero and the standard deviation of the optimal interest rate decreases
with the positive uncertainty parameter and reaches a minimum equal to 1.23 p.p. at
un = 3 for the model with uncorrelated uncertainty (Scenario 4). Hence by taking into
account parameter uncertainty we observe the interest rate smoothing effect, however
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the actual policy is sightly more gradual, where the standard deviation measure is 0.93
p.p.
Robust momentary policy causes that the optimal inflations CPI∗ for un = 1, 2, 3,
presented on theFig. 1,wander off slightly from its target level as uncertainty increases.
But robust inflation paths are still closer to the inflation target than the empirical path
of inflation. The standard deviations of the optimal and robust inflation rate from the
target belongs to the interval (0.50p.p., 0.89p.p.) while the average standard deviation
of their empirical counterpart is equal to 1.39 p.p.
Moreover, strong fluctuations of optimal interest rate cause relatively large changes
of the optimal output gap (see Table 3), but all optimal and robust paths of output
gap are less fluctuating than historical trajectories. Under our versions of the model
CB’s monetary rule with and without parameter uncertainty brings also grater REER∗
fluctuations than the actual monetary policy reflected in the empirical series of REER.
Furthermore, all optimal and robust trajectories with different levels of uncertainty
have the same turning points, while the optimal trajectory of interest rates, inflation
and the output gap differ from historical counterparts. The optimal policy rules are
better, in terms of implementation of strict inflation targeting than the realized policy
in Poland in the period 2008q1–2013q4.
From the abovewe can conclude that there is a classical trade off between variability
of policy instrument and closeness of target variables (inflation, output gap) to their
targets. Moreover, for a high level of parameter uncertainty un = 2, 3 the correlation
between parameters distribution increases the volatility of robust interest and exchange
rates correspondingly it makes the average distance between inflation and inflation
target smaller. Finally, the model with un = 3 and uncorrelated uncertainty (Scenario
4) turns out to be the closest to actual data for the Polish economy in period 2008q1–
2013q4.
5.2 Uncertainty Versus Interest Rate Smoothing
In this section we compare the effect of adding the interest rate smoothing term to the
CB objective with the influence of parameter uncertainty on the variability of policy
rule. The results shows that there is a trade off between model uncertainty and the
interest rate smoothing incentive in CB objective function (see Table 4; Fig. 2). In
Table 4 we collect the variability measures from three scenarios. The first two include
the models without parameter uncertainty (Scenarios 1 and 2), and only in Scenario
2 we have the interest rate smoothing term in the central bank objective function. We
compare them to the data consistent model found in the previous section (i.e. Scenario
4 with un = 3).
It turns out to be possible to calibrate the smoothing parameter ν = 0.55 in such a
way that the distance between the optimal monetary policy rule with smoothing term
at objective function (Scenario 2) and robust monetary policy rule from Scenario 4
with un = 3 is minimal (see Table 413). Hence this proves that the gradual movements
of interest rate commonly observed in much empirical data can be explained by the
13 Our simulations confirm that this result seems to be robust with respect to the values of λ ∈ (0, 5).
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Scenario un |π∗| (%) |i∗| (%) |x∗| (%) |q∗| (%)
1 (λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 0 0.51 3.06 0.89 9.28
2 (λ = 0.2, ν = 0.55) 0 0.84 1.23 1.03 7.68
4 (corr = 0, λ = 0.2, ν = 0) 1 0.52 2.25 0.89 8.71
2 0.64 1.58 0.93 8.09
3 0.89 1.23 0.99 7.56
Actual – 1.39 0.93 1.19 5.90
Fig. 2 The actual, optimal and robust trajectories in Scenarios 1, 2 and 4
optimal monetary policy models not only by adding interest rate smoothing term to the
CB objective but the same behaviour of interest rate can be obtained from the robust
monetary transmission model with an appropriate level of parameter uncertainty.
5.3 Impulse Response Analysis
The next part of the paper includes a comparison of impulse response functions (IRFs)
obtained from the VAR model with those from the optimal and robust models.
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In the Figs. 3, 4 and 5 for the VAR model we put a grey continuous line for the
average IRF paths and their mean ±2 standard deviation. Black dashed and doted
lines represent IRFs in optimal and robust models with different types or levels of
uncertainty. In the first row of each panel of Figs. 3, 4 and 5 we present the effects of
exogenous shocks: εx , επ , εq on interest rates, respectively. The second row contains
responses of the output gap, inflation and interest rate to monetary policy shock, εi .
Figure 3 presents IRFs in Scenarios 1 and 4. Notice that the impulse response
functions in the VAR model and models with robust and optimal monetary rules are
economically plausible, but the latter exhibit different shape patterns than those of
the VAR model. All the responses of optimal and robust WIBOR1M∗ to price (επ ),
demand (εx ) and exchange rate (εq ) shocks have a maximum level at the beginning
and are significantly stronger than hump-shaped patterns ofWIBOR1M reactions from
the VARmodel. Moreover, we can observe an interest rate smoothing effect via uncer-
tainty. For the models with certainty or with small values of the parameter uncertainty
(un = 0, 1) we observe very aggressive reactions of optimal monetary rules to the
exogenous shocks, but as un goes up these responses become up to 3 times lower,
simultaneously the time of the return of the robust interest rate to equilibrium is
longer. Furthermore, a stabilizing effect after monetary policy shock on the output gap
and onCP I is present in models with optimal and robust momentary policy. Hence, in
particular the costs of monetary policy tightening in terms of output losses are also sig-
nificantly lower than in VAR model. Moreover, the responses of REER∗,WIBOR1M∗
to monetary shock εit in the optimal policy model are very aggressive, but the robust
polices attenuate them and make the return of all variables to steady state after interest
rate shock longer.
In Fig. 4 we compare the IRFs of models with different structures of uncertainty.
Adding correlation between random parameters and exogenous shocks has an effect
in the opposite direction by increasing the maximal reaction of policy instrument to
demand (εxt ) and price (ε
π
t ) shocks and shortens their time of return to equilibrium.
We can also observe that the correlation structure of parameters decreases slightly the
time at which inflation, output gap and interest rate is at steady state after the interest
rate shock.
Finally, Fig. 5 presents IRFs of the model from Scenario 2—with a positive interest
rate smoothing parameter ν = 0.55, and compares it with the reaction from the optimal
policy model (Scenario 1) and the data consistent robust monetary policy model (Sce-
nario 4). We can observe the considerable similarity between the IRFs in Scenarios
2 and 4 (black dashed and black doted lines). Scenario 2 gives slightly less oscillat-
ing reactions of WIBOR1M∗, and the maximum response of inflation is somewhat
stronger.
Nextwe calculate the feedbackVARhorizons and the optimal horizons (seeTable 5)
defined as the time at which inflation should be on target (90% of maximal response
vanishes) in the future after one standard deviation shock in the VAR model and
optimal and robust models, respectively [cf. Batini and Nelson (2001)]. From Table 5
we conclude that all optimal horizons are shorter than the feedback VAR horizons,
especially for shock from target (επ ) and instrument (εi ) variables the difference is
striking. Moreover, in Scenarios 3, 4, 5 (i.e. in models without interest rate smoothing
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Table 5 VAR policy horizons and optimal policy horizons (in quarters of a year)







Scenario 1 12 2 13 3
Scenario 2 8 6 8 9
VAR 17 14 16 19
























1 11 3 8 4 11 3 8 4 12 3 9 5
3 9 5 7 7 11 6 7 9 12 4 9 9
of optimal inflation longer by as much as 6 quarters in Scenarios 4. At the same
time the increase in parameter un does not change significantly the time of return of
inflation after the demand shock εx . Finally, comparing the times of inflation return
to equilibrium we are able to match closely the model with interest rate smoothing
incentive (Scenario 2)with themodelwith uncorrelated uncertainty structure (Scenario
4 with un = 3). The last observation is another confirmation of the trade off between
interest rate smoothing and model uncertainty.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a general method based on the dynamic programming principle
to derive optimal monetary policy rules with multiplicative uncertainty. These rules
are robust with respect to parameter uncertainty of the structural model thus they yield
a data consistent paths of short run interest rate.
For Polish quarterly data in the period 2008–2014 we find optimal and robust mon-
etary policy rules. We notice that standard optimal rules with parameter certainty are
inconsistent with data, they produce a very aggressive policy. However, the volatility
of the robust interest rate decreases with positive parameter uncertainty. With a high
level of uncertainty the optimal policy model matches closer actual data and gener-
ates significantly smoother and less oscillating impulse responses of interest rate and
exchange rate. Therefore, our findings confirm the Brainard conservatism principle.
A high level of model uncertainty is also responsible for interest rate smoothing
behaviour commonly presented in empirical data. We confirm that there is a trade off
between parameter uncertainty and the interest rate smoothing incentive. However,
the correlation between parameters uncertainty has the opposite effect and leads to
an increase in magnitude of interest rate response to shocks and at the same time, it
shortens the time of return to equilibrium.
Finally, the stabilizing effect of parameter uncertainty on IRFs of state variables to
monetary policy shock is confirmed.All optimal horizons are shorter than the feedback
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Appendix 1
(
,F ,P, (Ft )t=0,1,...) be a probability space with filtration.
Lemma 1 Let Z , z and U, u be random vectors of dimensions n × 1 and m × 1,
respectively, moreover, let Z = [Z ′1, . . . , Z ′k]′k×n, U = [U ′1, . . . ,U ′k]′k×m and A =[ai j ]m×k, B = [bi j ]m×n be random matrices such that z, u,A,B are Ft -measurable
for some t ≥ 1. Then, we have:
E (〈BZ ,U 〉 |Ft ) = 〈BE(Z |Ft ),E(U |Ft )〉 + tr(BΣt,ZU ), (17)


















where Σt,ZU = E((Z − EZ)(U − EU )′|Ft ) = [σt,i j ]n×m and Σt,ZiU j = E((Zi −
EZi )(Uj − EUj )′|Ft ) for i = 1, 2, . . . k, j = 1, 2, . . .m and e1, . . . , em is standard
basis in Rm.
Proof By straightforward calculation we get













E(Zi |Ft )E(Uj |Ft ) + σt,i j
)
= 〈BE(Z |Ft ),E(U |Ft )〉 + tr(BΣt,ZU ).
Using (17) we can prove (18) and (19). Indeed, for (18) we have:




















and for (19) we obtain:
123
Robust Monetary Policy in a Model of the Polish…










′, . . . , (Uku)′
]′〉 |Ft
)




Let Xt :Ω → RN , t = 0, 1, . . . T be a sequence of random variable. Assume that








ut + ξt+1 for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . T − 1
X0 − known value, (20)
where A ∈ RN×N ,B ∈ Rc×N , Dt ∈ RN are known matrices, ut is a control process,
ξt , ξ
A
t = [ξA′1,t+1, . . . , ξA
′
N ,t+1]′N×N , ξBt = [ξB
′
1,t+1, . . . , ξB
′
N ,t+1]′N×N , t = 1, 2, . . .
are sequences of random variables with conditional means and covariances defined
by (H1) and (H2) below. For instance ξAj,t+1 is a random row vector represent-
ing parameter uncertainty of A in the j-equation of the system (20). Let F0 =
σ(X0,D1, . . . ,DT ) be initial σ -algebra of events and for all t = 1, 2. . . . , T we
define Ft = σ(F0, ξ1, . . . , ξt , ξA1 , . . . , ξAt , ξB1 , . . . , ξBt ) We assume that the follow-
ing hypothesis holds. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 and all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N we
have:
(H1)E(ξt+1|Ft ) = E(ξAt+1|Ft ) = E(ξBt+1|Ft ) = 0,
(H2)Cov(ξt+1, ξt+1|Ft ) = Σξ ,
Cov(ξBi,t+1, ξBj,t+1|Ft ) = ΣB,i, j ,
Cov(ξAi,t+1, ξAj,t+1|Ft ) = ΣA,i, j ,
Cov(ξAi,t+1, ξt+1|Ft ) = ΣAξ,i ,
Cov(ξBi,t+1, ξt+1|Ft ) = ΣBξ,i ,
Cov(ξAi,t+1, ξBj,t+1|Ft ) = ΣAB,i, j .
In (H1)–(H2) it is assumed that at initial time 0 the policymakers knows the conditional
means, variances and covariances between model parameters and exogenous shocks.












〈FtXt , ut 〉 + 1
2




where γ > 0, Q1, . . . ,QT ≥ 0, R1, . . . ,RT−1 > 0 and F1,F2, . . .FT−1 ∈ RN×c.






t=0 : ut = ut (X0,X1 . . . ,Xt ) ∈ Rc, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1
}
is called a linear–quadratic problem with multiplicative uncertainty. Notice that for
(ut )
T−1
t=0 we have Xt ∼ Ft for all t and hence ut ∼ Ft .
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Aξ ,GBξ ,GAB be the uncertainty operators defined by
(30)–(34). If the sequence of matrices Rt , t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 defined below by
(27) is positive definite, then the value function for the linear–quadratic problem with
multiplicative uncertainty is of the form:




〈Kt x, x〉 + 〈pt , x〉 + vt
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T (22)
where








γA′Kt+1B + F′t + γGAB(Kt+1)
)Rt
(
γB′ (Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1)
+ γG
B
ξ(Kt+1)) + γA′ (Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGAξ (Kt+1), (24)

















γB′t (Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGBξ (Kt+1))
)
,
γB′t (Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + (γGBξ (Kt+1))
〉
,
KT = QT , pT = 0, vT = 0, (25)
Moreover, the solution to the linear–quadratic problemwith multiplicative uncertainty
is given by
u∗t = GtX∗t + gt , (26)
Gt = −Rt
(











Rt + γGB(Kt+1) + γB′tKt+1Bt
)−1 (27)
and (X∗t )t=0,1,...,T is the optimal state sequence:
X
∗




for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
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Proof We use the dynamic programming principle (seeWhittle 1996; Zabczyk 1996).
Let VT , VT−1, . . . , V0 be a sequence of value function defined by:





〈Qt x, x〉 + 〈Ft x, u〉 + 1
2
〈Rt u, u〉 + E (Vt+1(Ft+1(x, u))|Ft )
)
,






for all x ∈ RN , t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, where Ft+1(x, u) = Dt+1 + (A+ ξAt+1)x + (B+
ξBt+1)u + ξt+1. Notice that (22) is satisfied for T with KT = QT , pT = 0, vT = 0.
We assume that (22) holds for t + 1 < T and we calculate Vt . Observe that
E(Vt+1(Ft+1(x, u))|Ft )) = γ t+1
(1
2
E (〈Kt+1Ft+1(x, u), Ft+1(x, u)〉 |Ft )




E (〈Kt+1Ft+1(x, u), Ft+1(x, u)〉 |Ft ) = 〈Kt+1 (Dt+1 + Ax + Bu) ,Dt+1 + Ax + Bu〉
+ 2E
(〈








ξAt+1x + ξBt+1u + ξt+1
)





By (H1) the second term in the above equation vanishes. Using (H2) and Lemma 1





ξAt+1x + ξBt+1u + ξt+1
)






(Kt+1)x〉 + 〈u,GB(Kt+1)u〉 + tr(Kt+1Σξ)
+ 2 〈x,G
Aξ (Kt+1)
〉 + 2 〈u,G
Bξ (Kt+1)
〉 + 2 〈x,G
AB
(Kt+1)u〉 ,
where the uncertainty operators G
A














































ki jΣAB,i, j , (34)
for all K ∈ RN×N , x, y ∈ RN and u, w ∈ Rc. Applying the definitions of uncertainty
operators in (29) and then substituting (29) in (28), we obtain:

























〉 + γ 〈u,G
Bξ (Kt+1)
〉 + γ 〈x,G
AB
(Kt+1) u〉
+ γ 〈pt+1,Dt+1 + Ax + Bu〉 + γ vt+1
)
.
After the rearrangement we have


















Aξ (Kt+1) + γGAB(Kt+1) + γA′ pt+1, x














a = (γB′Kt+1A + Ft + γG ′
AB
(Kt+1))x + γB′(Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGBξ (Kt+1),
and where Rt is given by (27). Hence solving the above optimization problem we
obtain the optimal control u∗t = Gt x + gt with
Gt = −Rt
(




gt = −Rt (γB′(Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGBξ (Kt+1)),
Finally, the optimal value of Vt (x) takes the form




〈Rt a, a〉 + 1
2
〈
(Qt + γA′Kt+1A + γGA(Kt+1))x, x
〉
+ 〈γG
Aξ (Kt+1) + γA′Kt+1Dt+1 + γA′ pt+1, x
〉 + γ vt+1 + γ 〈pt+1,Dt+1〉
+ 1
2
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where
〈Rt a, a〉 =
〈Rt
(










γB′(Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGBξ (Kt+1)
)








x, γB′(Kt+1Dt+1 + pt+1) + γGBξ (Kt+1)
〉
.
After rearrangement we obtain (22).
Appendix 2
We assume in Sect. 3.1 that the model parameters at interest rate and state variable
are assumed to be random variables. In order to conduct the experiments with opti-
mal and robust policy we estimate the first two moments of model parameters by
means of the ordinary least square (OLS) method.14 Let us recall that for VAR mod-
els OLS estimators of the following parameters are consistent and asymptomatically
normal and uncorrelated with model exogenous shocks. But in the finite samples they
are biased in mean, and their variances and covariance are correlated with exoge-
nous shocks (cf. Judge et al. 1988). OLS estimators of A = [A1, A2, A3]′, B =
[B1, B2, B3]′,Σ,m,A, σ 2m,B,Σm,AB,Σm,Aξ e ,Σm,Bξ e are given by15
[Aˆm, Bˆm] = Proj4(X′X)−1X′Ym) (35)
Σˆ = 1




Σˆ ′m,AB σˆ 2m,B
]














form = 1, 2, 3 (m is number of the equation) andwhereX = [Y−1, i, 1, oil, oil−1]7×N ,
Y = [y′1; y′2; . . . ; y′N ]′ = [Y1,Y2,Y3]3×N , Y−1 = [y′0; y′1; . . . ; y′N−1]′, i =[i0, i1, . . . , iN−1]′, 1 = [1, 1, . . . , 1]′, oil = [oil1, oil2, . . . , oilN ]′, oil−1 = [oil0,
oil1, . . . , oilN−1]′ are the matrices consist of samples of state and control variables
and ξˆ e = [ξˆ e1 ; . . . ; ξˆ eT ]′ = are the residuals i.e. ξˆ et = yt − yˆt , yˆt = X[Aˆ, Bˆ, cˆ0, Cˆ0, Cˆ1]
for t = 1, 2, . . . , N .16
14 We can use any estimation method of the model eg the Bayesian technique and then use the posterior
variances and covariance of model parameters to construct the uncertainty operators.
15 For any k, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} such that n > k let us denote by Projk the canonical projection from Rn to
R
k or from M(n, n) to M(k, k) defined by taking the first k or k × k coordinates from its argument.












































t are fundamental shocks in the economy called demand, price,
exchange rate and interest rate shocks, respectively. Notice that P11, P21, P22 satisfy
P−122 P21P
−1
11 = I − D0, ξ = P11P′11 and σ = P222. In the optimal monetary model
we replace the empirical policy rule from (1) by its optimal counterpart [see (12)]
and make the shock identification procedure complete by imposing all three possible
zero restrictions on elements of matrix P11 and analysing the signs of the impulse
response functions (IRFs) of optimal interest rates in the model with certainty. We
choose the matrix P11 which gives contractionary response of the optimal interest rate
to demand, εxt , and price, ε
π
t , shocks and expansionary response to the exchange rate
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